Protecting a Client's Right to Councel in the Face of Seizure of Funds
 
This article, written by Alan Silber, originally appeared in “The Vindicator”, magazine of the Ohio Criminal Defense Bar in 1998

          A major component of the government’s attack on the private criminal defense bar has been the deprivation of a defendant’s constitutional right to counsel of choice by the seizure of funds which would be used to pay counsel.  Silber, A., The War on Drugs is Destroying an Independent Defense Bar, The Champion (March 1991).  When the law firm has accepted fees at the outset of the case, it may have to defend against the government’s efforts to seize the funds directly from them, even after counsel has already spent the money. 

          Usually, fees earned by law firms prior to the institution of forfeiture claims, and other similar government claims upon funds or prior to counsel’s knowledge of those claims, may be kept by the law firm.  Thus, having the money received deemed fully earned before counsel acquires any knowledge that the fee may be forfeitable or otherwise seized, will help the law firm keep the fee, and the client his counsel of choice.  The retainer agreement itself will be analyzed to determine whether the retainer paid was earned at the time it was paid or will be earned in the future when legal services are performed. 

          A civil case, SEC v. Interlink Data Network of Los Angeles, Inc., 77 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 1996), explains the desirability for categorizing fees received as already earned rather than monies held as advanced payments.  The SEC filed a civil action alleging securities fraud, and obtained a TRO, which froze the assets of Interlink, even if held by a third party.  Third parties were required to retain (and ultimately return) the funds which were actually Interlink’s.  Therefore, fees could not be earned by the law firm after it had received actual notice.  The SEC sought the fees that had been paid to counsel, while the law firm claimed the fees had been earned and were “already in our account”.  The Ninth Circuit put the issue as “whether under the terms of the . . . fee agreement, the advance deposit was earned by [the law firm] upon payment or when services were [actually] rendered.”  Ultimately, it was the terms of the retainer agreement itself which categorized the fees paid as advanced fees that was the law firm’s undoing. 

          Retainer agreements use different terms and concepts to identify and define the financial arrangement between lawyer and client.  The nomenclature given to the money which is received from the client at the beginning of the lawyer/client relationship can have an effect both on counsel’s ability to keep the fee in the event the government comes calling, and on compliance with applicable ethical rules.  The word “retainer” covers different concepts:  (a) a general retainer, sometimes called classic retainer, is money paid by a client to secure an attorney’s availability over a period of time.  The general rule is that this fee is earned by the attorney when paid.  However, the concept needs to be tortured to fit the case of the criminal defendant, and can cause more problems than it solves (i.e., the consigliore allegation); (b) frequently, what is called a retainer is actually an advanced deposit against future fees.  Such a retainer has been held to be the client’s property, which is required to be held in trust until earned by the lawyer’s actual performance of legal work; and (c) non-refundable retainer is a term indicating that, regardless of events, the fee will never be less, so the fee has been earned by the law firm when paid.  The term and the concept “non-refundable” have presented ethical problems.  Other commonly used terms are minimum fee and flat fee. 

          In order to be able to say that the fee was earned -- and therefore, the firm was entitled to keep the fee because at the time title to the funds vested with it the law firm was an innocent owner (no knowledge that the funds were subject to forfeiture or other seizure) -- the funds cannot still be the property of the client.  It is essential that the terms of the retainer agreement specify that title to the funds has passed to the law firm and why.   Those reasons can be the extensive scope of the legal work to be done on an immediate basis; the need to hire additional personnel; the need to devote a substantial portion of the firm’s resources so it could not take another large case if offered; that the firm will be conflicted out of a substantial opportunity to represent a co-defendant; or, any other reason that is unique to specific facts.  However, when a minimum fee has been described as a non-refundable retainer, courts and commentators have found ethical problems. 

          A growing wave of law review articles and judicial opinions have criticized non-refundable retainers as forbidden and unethical.  The rationale is that such agreements create an impermissible chilling effect on the client’s inherent right, upon public policy grounds, to discharge the attorney at any time with or without cause.  Because that inherent right is fundamental, a pure contract analogy does not fit the agreements governing financial relations between lawyers and clients.  The client always has the right to fire his counsel without cause or reason.  No financial arrangement can burden that right. [1]    In the Matter of Edward Cooperman, 83 N.Y.2d 645; 633 N.Ed. 1069, 611 N.Y.S. 2d 465 (Court of App. N.Y. 1994); Olsen & Brown v. City of Englewood, 867 P.2d 96, aff’d. 889 P.2d 673 (Colo. 1995); Brickman & Cunningham, Non-refundable Retainers Revisited, 72 N.C.L. Rev. 1, 6 (1993); Brickman & Cunningham Non-refundable Retainers: Impermissible Under Fiduciary, Statutory, and Contract Law.  57 Fordham Law Review 149 (1988); Lubet, The Rush to Remedies: Some Conceptual Questions About Non-refundable Retainers, 73 N.C.L Rev. 271 (1994); Note, No Leg to Stand on: The General Retainer Exception to the Ban on Non-refundable Retainers Must Fall, 17 Cardozo Law Review 719 (1996); Rothrock, On Retainers, Flat Fees, and Commingling, 26 Colorado Lawyer 83 (1997); Dipippa, Lawyers, Clients and Money, 18 U. Ark Little Rock LJ 95 (1995); Wong v. Kennedy, 853 F.Supp. 73 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); partial judgment for plaintiff, at 1995 WL 322204 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 1995). 

          We must take great care to never burden the client’s inherent right to get rid of us as his counsel at any time.  His right to a refund under those circumstances -- no matter what we call his payment of money -- is essential to avoiding potential ethical problems.  We should include in all retainer agreements a paragraph similar to: 

                   However, notwithstanding the above, if you choose to discontinue our services prior to completion of [describe the legal services for which the firm has been retained] any unearned portion of the minimum fee (less out-of-pocket expenses) shall be returned to you. 

          While the term “non-refundable retainer” has become suspect, it is not the word “non-refundable” but the terms that are spelled out within the retainer agreement that control.  In the very New York case which held that non-refundable retainers were unethical, In the Matter of Edward Cooperman, the Court of Appeals (New York’s highest court) specifically stated that minimum fee arrangements were acceptable.  What is the difference between a non-refundable retainer and a minimum fee? A minimum fee has been defined as “an arrangement with a client that provides for the payment of a specific amount below which the fee will not fall based upon the handling of the case to its conclusion.”  Rosen v. Rosen, 614 N.Y.S. 2d 1018 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. 1994), (emphasis added).  Cooperman refused to give back any portion of his “non-refundable retainer” when discharged by the client after the case had just begun.  He was suspended from the practice for two (2) years.  Unlike, the “non-refundable” retainer in Cooperman, the minimum fee in Rosen “did not provide for retention of unearned fees” and thus continues to be valid and does not subject a lawyer to discipline.  Id.   See also Kelly v. M.D. Bayline, Inc.        F.3d        (S.D.N.Y. 97 Civ. 0096 (KMW) 4/1/98) (general retainer not limited by Cooperman prohibition).   

          “Flat fees” or “fixed fees” have been called into question as well. Oregon’s Proposed Formal Ethics Opinion No. 1998-151 highlights the need to clearly spell out the details of the financial arrangement with the client in a written retainer agreement.  Whatever we call monies we have taken, we must do two things:  (1) specify in the retainer agreement why the fee has been earned and ensure that it is not an advanced deposit against future fees; and (2) make unmistakably clear that the client always has the right to terminate the relationship at any time, and that he will owe only the amount of money that the lawyer has earned on a quantum meruit basis.  See, Analytical Approaches to the Non-refundable Retainer, 9 Georgetown Law Journal of Legal Ethics 583 (1996). 

          Earned fees may not be kept in the firm’s trust account.  A lawyer may not commingle his own funds with the client’s.  It is a mark of the unearned fee, which has been advanced by a client, that it is kept in the trust account.  Indeed, such a fee must ethically be kept in the trust account, and cannot be used by the law firm before it is earned.  Earned fees must be deposited in the firm’s business account.  Brickman, The Advanced Free Payment Dilemma:  Should Payments Be Deposited to the Client Trust Account or the General Office Account?  10 Cardozo Law Review  647 (1989). 

          In SEC v. Interlink, the Ninth Circuit used deposit of the Interlink fees into the firm’s trust account as support for the conclusion that the firm had not yet earned that money.  However, it is a wise management policy to spend only the monies which have been earned, even if counsel is entitled to the full payment.  Not everyone has the ability to pay the money back after it has been spent.    

          A practical answer is to open a special account in the name of the firm.  When the money moves to that account, it is earned for tax purposes.  However, if drawn only as earned (by hours), the money is there for refund should the client terminate the lawyer/client relationship.

Conclusion

          Written retainer agreements are compelled by many states, and are universally favored.  Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5(b).  There are precious few circumstances where having a written retainer agreement is not the most professional, safest and most desirable route.  The existence of a retainer agreement with specific terms not only maximizes a client’s right to counsel of choice, but also the practitioner’s right to be fairly compensated for his efforts on his client’s behalf. 



[1]     Counsel is, of course, entitled to compensation on a quantum meruit basis in the event that the client terminates the relationship.  Always keep track of hours spent on a case regardless of the terms of the retainer agreement.  The hourly rates should be in the retainer agreement regardless of its terms (even if it is a flat fee).  Keeping hours is not only good law management practice, but it is essential in the event a fee dispute develops.  Putting the hourly rate in the retainer agreement is additional evidence of the appropriate amount of a quantum meruit recovery.